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1. Introduction 
Brazil’s insertion in the global political economy has usually been 
painted as a situation of “periphery”, perhaps most vividly, although 
he was not writing exclusively about Brazil, by Samuel Pinheiro  
Guimarães, who is now Secretary General of Itamaraty and whose 
“500 years of periphery” is now required reading for incoming Brazil-
ian diplomats (Guimarães 2001). From that standpoint, Brazil’s pe-
ripheral international status is not understood as a situation of “mere” 
marginality but instead as the continuing result of a dynamic relation-
ship between a centre that benefits from its asymmetric character and 
works at perpetuating it. In that perspective, Brazil’s foreign policy is 
primarily reactive and essentially defensive. 
My starting point is different. Brazil’s peripheral status in the 
world for most of its history, and for the purpose of this paper, spe-
cifically since WWII, is accepted. It is understood, however, as a 
situation of mutual irrelevance: Brazil has had a superficial insertion 
in the global political economy and in the global strategic landscape. 
This has meant that, all the talk about dependency notwithstanding, 
the world has had relatively little bearing on Brazil. Its political and 
economic disasters as well as its successes have been essentially of its 
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own making. Domestic factors, in other words, have been the main 
determinant of Brazilian foreign policy, they have had the most influ-
ence on the definition of the interests that were defended and pro-
moted, on the resources mobilized for that purpose, and on the way in 
which that policy was implemented. Brazil’s insertion in the world is 
now changing because Brazil is.  
The argument of this paper is straightforward: Brazil’s peripheral 
status is ending, in part because the world is becoming more relevant 
to its fate, but mostly because Brazil has become more appealing to 
the world, particularly to its dominant powers, as a result of its con-
solidation as a stable, democratic and liberal power. While the coun-
try’s diplomacy has always been extremely competent and while it has 
also been increasingly assertive, particularly since the mid-1980s, a 
number of domestic factors had severely constrained it. Chief among 
those, Brazil’s political system remained in transition, the fundamental 
direction of its economic policy and the fate of its economic adjust-
ment were still uncertain and its international image was still marred 
by dramatic social inequities. On all three counts, the elections and the 
months that followed changed the equation. 
This domestic dynamic is outlined in the following section. An 
overview of Lula’s foreign policies follows, and their impact are as-
sessed in a third part.  
 
2. The Election of Lula and Brazilian Foreign Policy 
2.1 Democratic Consolidation 
A classic test of democratic consolidation is a real change in govern-
ing authorities. This is one of the reason why political scientists for a 
long time questioned the depth of democratic roots in Japan where one 
party, the LDP, ruled essentially unopposed for some forty years. The 
test is particularly significant when a large ideological distance has 
traditionally separated contending forces, for instance when conserva-
tive or liberal parties are replaced by socialist or communist ones. 
When such a change takes place without significant upheaval, there 
are extremely sound reasons to conclude that a political consensus 
exists regarding the legitimacy of the political institutions of the coun-
try. This is why the return of the Peronists to power was so important 
in Argentina, and why the electoral success of the FMLN and the vic-
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tories of the Liberals, of the PAN and of the Frente Amplio were so 
significant in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico and Uruguay. This is 
also why doubts will be justified about Guatemala until the Left wins 
something significant, and about Venezuela until Chavez and his party 
lose one election, if only to win the next one.  
Such a fundamental change is the huge step forward that Brazil 
took in 2002. The victory of Lula and the spectacular success of the 
PT in congressional elections clearly demonstrated that Brazil’s de-
mocracy was sound and that its various political forces, its military, 
and its economic elites were willing to let clean elections rule the day. 
Obviously, the process was well under way and in fact, the commit-
ment of Brazilian elites to democratic arrangements had been success-
fully tested a number of times, beginning with the smooth passage to 
José Sarney, following the death of Tancredo Neves, and particularly 
on the occasion of the resignation of Fernando Collor de Mello. The 
test of ideological alternance, however, was still to be passed as the 
same political coalition, the Centrão, had basically been in power 
since the return to civilian rule, in 1985.  
The institutional soundness demonstrated in 2002 has a number of 
meanings that are relevant for Brazil’s foreign policy. Some are abso-
lute: the country’s foreign policy can claim a degree of legitimacy, 
both domestic and international, that were simply out of reach during 
the authoritarian period. In addition, the democratic consensus ensures 
a degree of political stability that gives credibility to the country’s 
international commitment. Other implications are relative: in South 
America, and more broadly, in Latin America and the Caribbean, this 
kind of political stability is increasingly uncommon, and the fact that 
it is to be found in the largest and most powerful country of the region 
readily confers to Brazil the status of a political and strategic anchor.  
 
2.2 (Neo-)Liberal Consolidation 
In its specifics, the liberal economic cookbook remains highly conten-
tious (Naim 2000). Feminist, post-colonial and post-Marxist academ-
ics have raised numerous and sometimes compelling doubts about its 
assumptions and theoretical claims, while in the streets, during inter-
national meetings and People’s Summits, thousands have denounced 
its practical implications. In global policy circles, however, and in 
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national central banks and finance departments the world over, there is 
little debate about the broad contours of a “sound” economic policy, 
and these contours are unmistakably liberal or, more precisely, neo-
liberal: fiscal equilibrium, low inflation, open markets, secure prop-
erty rights and an independent central bank – formally if possible, 
informally if necessary (Yusuf/Stiglitz 2001; Bhalla 2002). It is not 
that all the governments in the world are abiding by these rules and 
requirements, but few of the “delinquents” present their current poli-
cies as anything but a “state of exception”, promising to correct their 
faults as soon as the conditions permit. 
The liberal “grammar” also dominates global trade regimes and 
multilateral institutions, and a credible commitment to broadly respect 
its rules is a sine qua non to joining those regimes or to engaging with 
its major players. The global economic game, in other words, is gov-
erned according to a liberal rules book, and the only way to join it is to 
accept its dictates.  
This clearly was the previous government’s view. Cardoso, ever 
since he introduced the Real Plan as Itamar Franco’s finance minister, 
played the game and he was widely praised for doing so. In many 
ways, he was also very successful, launching the first period of eco-
nomic stability that Brazil had known in a generation.  
Brazil’s long-term commitment to this outlook remained in doubt, 
however, both domestically and internationally, for very simple rea-
sons: the most powerful and prestigious left-wing party in Latin 
America, the PT, was a strong critic of the neo-liberal consensus, eve-
rybody knew that it would be a very credible contender to the Presi-
dency and, undoubtedly, that it would remain a powerful player in the 
Brazilian congress. Logically, as the electoral campaign progressed in 
the summer and fall of 2002, and as Lula stayed ahead in the polls, a 
mild panic set in, capital started flowing out, and the Real went into a 
minor tailspin (Williamson 2002).  
Lula’s team was quick to present itself as a credible player, assur-
ing private and multilateral bankers that a PT government would ser-
vice its debt, guaranteeing the domestic private sector of its commit-
ment to fiscal discipline and “moderation” and, as further proof of 
“credibility”, supporting publicly the Cardoso government’s agree-
ment with the International Monetary Fund. In the end Lula won, the 
PT became even more powerful in Congress, but the first two years of 
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the new regime have been the story of the consolidation of economic 
orthodoxy. An analysis of that policy lies beyond the scope of this 
paper, but a few landmarks are worth mentioning: in the first session 
of the new Congress, the government successfully articulated a coali-
tion to block an – admittedly demagogic – attempt to raise the mini-
mum salary; the IMF agreement was renewed by the government and 
monetary and fiscal policies remain to this day extremely restrictive; a 
well-known international banker and card-carrying member of Car-
doso’s PSDB, Henrique Meireles, was chosen to head the Central 
Bank; the Fiscal Responsibility Law, which heavily constrains the 
government’s spending ability, was maintained; and, in the face of 
growing restiveness on the part of the Left of the Workers’ Party, 
radical members of its deputation in Congress were condemned as 
irresponsible and then expelled altogether from the party.  
If there is a consensus in the public and academic discussion about 
Brazil, in fact, it regards the surprising conversion of the PT in power 
to neo-liberalism. The agreement is universal: from the sad musings of 
Fernando Gabeira about his “having dreamed the wrong dream”, to 
the accolades of the IMF (2005);1 from the spite of the PT’s Left, of 
the Movimento dos Sem Terras, and of North American radical aca-
demics about Lula’s treason (Petras 2005; Chossudovsky 2003), to the 
Financial Times Group’s Direct Investment magazine’s selection of 
Lula as its “Personality of the Year” for 2004. Wherever one looks, 
moreover, there is nothing in the country’s economic policy to chal-
lenge the Right’s praise or, for that matter, the Left’s curses.  
This “turn” of the PT, and this non-turn of the government’s eco-
nomic policy, has a number of significant implications for Brazil’s 
foreign policy. The first one is that the country’s economic stability 
has been bolstered, with the fall 2002 panic quickly evaporating as the 
country went from moderate growth but total macro-economic stabil-
ity in 2003, to remarkable growth and continuing stability in 2004. If 
anything, the initial lack of growth further contributed to the credibil-
ity of the government’s commitment to fiscal discipline. In the context 
                                                     
1  “Directors welcomed Brazil’s impressive economic achievements over the last 
two years, and the remarkable track record of performance under the Stand-By 
Arrangement, which reflected the authorities’ continued pursuit of strong macro-
economic policies and steady progress with structural reforms” (IMF 2005: 2). 
Italics are mine. 
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of the crisis in Argentina and Uruguay and of the continuing uncer-
tainty in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, this makes Brazil a 
haven of tranquillity. The global prestige of the PT and of Lula, in 
particular, also confer a massive credibility to the “TINA” (“There Is 
No Alternative”) crowd, which quickly reacted by bringing Brazil on 
board, from Davos to Washington. The doubts about Brazil’s com-
mitment to the neo-liberal recipe book have disappeared as the policy, 
but also the message, became as clear as could be: in an article written 
barely one year into Lula’s mandate, Paulo Roberto de Almeida, refer-
ring to the competing World Social and World Economic fora, wrote 
“Porto Alegre Sim; Davos Não” (Almeida 2004), although Lula was 
the first world leader to go to both summits. The year after, Lula chose 
Davos and skipped Porto Alegre and, a year later, he did not show up 
either in Mumbai, where the social summit had moved. What message 
could be crisper?  
 
2.3 The “right” (Left) Image 
The third impact of Lula’s election is more immaterial. It has to do 
with the credibility in the North of Brazil’s claim to be a voice for the 
global South and the promoter of a more equitable international distri-
bution of wealth and power. Traditionally, it must be emphasized, 
Brazil has been somewhat lukewarm about assuming such a stand. 
Neither in the 1950s nor later did the country join the Non-Aligned 
Movement and its traditionally independent foreign policy was meant 
to be so in relations both to the superpowers and to the so-called Third 
Word. This “autonomous insertion” (Vigevani/Cepaluni 2007) was 
perhaps most vivid under Fernando Collor de Melo who, at the begin-
ning of the 1990s, explicitly sought to symbolically attach Brazil to 
the First World (Hirst/Pinheiro 1995; Cervo 2005).  
Collor’s resounding failure, both political and economic, some-
what discredited that “First World” stand. Yet the project of Brazil’s 
reinventing itself as a “Southern” voice – the “Third world” having 
disappeared along with the Second – needed to overcome a number of 
obstacles. Under Cardoso, and even leaving aside the shallow histori-
cal roots of such an identity, the sophisticated diplomat-intellectuals of 
Itamaraty and their multilingual, PhD-holding aristocratic President 
could hardly pose as the embodiment of the wretched of the earth. 
This was especially problematic given the massive social and racial 
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inequities that plague Brazil and make their worldly, wealthy and 
white foreign service poorly representative of a country that remains 
largely poor and mulato. 
From that standpoint, the election of Lula and his strong involve-
ment in foreign policy effectively opened up a whole new symbolic 
repertoire for Brazil (Burges 2005). Progressive global social stands 
were natural for him and he looked the part. His waging the “Fome 
Zero” (“Zero Hunger”) campaign both domestically and globally is 
the best expression of Brazil’s claim to speak and work for the poor 
and for the South. The fact that Lula set up a double-headed foreign 
policy machinery, imposing Marco Aurelio Garcia, a party activist, on 
the Itamaraty establishment, only reinforced the credibility of a pro-
gressive global agenda that the latter had scarcely identified with in 
the past.  
The stage was set, in sum, for a vastly different diplomacy.  
 
3. Lula’s Foreign Policies 
This overview organizes Brazil’s activities in three broad categories: 
trade, security and, for lack of a better word, “politics”, by which I 
mean that part of Brazilian foreign policy that is directed to global 
governance. The issues I will discuss under that heading regard pri-
marily but not exclusively the UN. 
A huge caveat is in order before starting this overview. As Paulo 
Roberto de Almeida recently pointed out (Almeida 2004), to charac-
terize Lula’s foreign policy after barely two years is a perilous exer-
cise and if the descriptive part of what follows is pretty sound, the 
interpretations I propose must be considered tentative.  
 
3.1 Trade: Playing the Game and Winning 
It is certainly on the trade front that Brazil has made its most spectacu-
lar gains in recent years. These were made both within existing re-
gimes (the WTO) and in the negotiations to expand those (the Doha 
Round) or to establish significant new ones (FTAA, EU-Mercosur). 
In its trade policy, Brazil’s current objectives are quite straight-
forward: getting as much as possible in the areas where the country is 
already most competitive (i.e. primarily agriculture), and giving as 
little as possible in those where the cost of adaptation – short, medium 
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or long-term – would be most severe, i.e. primarily in agriculture and 
possibly in services. In its general contours, this strategy is no differ-
ent from that of the vast majority of WTO members: in the liberal age, 
paradoxically, mercantilism rules trade policy.  
These objectives have been pursued extremely effectively and, by 
any standards, Brazil’s performance on the global trade scene over the 
last few years has been extraordinary and has made the country a cen-
tral and highly visible player, out of all proportion to its still limited 
weight in global trade.  
Two of the highest points of recent years involved the use of the 
regime itself against those who had designed and, until now, ruled it, 
namely the US and the EU. Brazil’s challenge of the US government’s 
subsidies to cotton production and of the European Union’s support 
for its sugar producers were received and accepted by the World 
Trade Organization’s dispute resolution mechanism and they survived 
appeals (WTO 2005a; 2005b). While the ultimate outcome of the dis-
putes, which are now in the hands of the US and the EU, is uncertain, 
the decisions represent a massive victory for agricultural exporters 
from Southern countries, on substance and on principles, and for the 
WTO itself, on legitimacy. 
In addition to these clear victories, Brazil has also made effective 
use of the WTO in its ongoing dispute with Canada regarding subsi-
dies to their respective aircraft manufacturers. While the outcome, in 
this case, is less clear cut, as both countries’ programs were faulted 
and as both were also allowed to impose tariff compensations (Gold-
stein/McGuire 2004), the process as such showed that Brazil could 
exploit existing rules very much to its advantage.  
Such effective use of the WTO by Brazil has not been limited to 
disputes with rich northern countries. In fact, most of Brazil’s requests 
to the WTO, which concerned anti-dumping investigations, involved 
products from developing countries, overwhelmingly China and to a 
lesser extent India, but also South Africa and even Mexico and Vene-
zuela (WTO 2004: 64). These are not introduced by the government, 
arising instead from private companies’ complaints, but they imply 
that the Brazilian private sector is now also able to fully exploit the 
regime. The frequency of those complaints has changed little under 
the new government as the latter, except recently and somewhat indi-
rectly in the very peculiar case of China – which is discussed below – 
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does not seem to be discouraging these practices, even when they are 
directed to Southern partners.  
While Brazil has on the one hand done quite well under the “old” 
regime, it has nonetheless contested some of its dispositions, particu-
larly in two broad areas. The first is intellectual property rights, where 
the TRIPS agreement has enshrined a distribution of guarantees that 
puts low-tech countries in an extremely disadvantageous position. The 
other is agriculture, where protectionism and subsidies dominate exist-
ing policies. 
Brazil’s strategy on both these cases, which has not changed fun-
damentally with the new government, has been primarily political. On 
property rights, the government has challenged the very legitimacy of 
the existing regime and its impact on the poorest countries, particu-
larly regarding anti-retroviral drugs. In concrete terms, Brazil has been 
a key player, along with South Africa, in the ultimately successful 
fight against brand name drug companies’ attempts to limit the rights 
of governments to impose compulsory licensing, something Brazil has 
done under Cardoso, and something it continues to do (CIPR 2002: 
11-56).  
On agriculture, aside from the full use of the prerogatives en-
shrined in the Marrakech agreement, Brazil has set up and led, alone 
or with key allies, such as India, a range of veto coalitions that were 
able to basically disable trade negotiation processes that did not in-
volve substantive concessions on protection or subsidies from the 
United States or the EU. Given the unwillingness of the latter – or 
their political inability – to make such concessions, this strategy has 
contributed to the failure of the Cancun meeting of the WTO and to 
the paralysis of the Doha Round of global trade negotiations (Jank/ 
Monteiro Jales 2004). It has also led to the stalling of the FTAA proc-
ess, and to the postponement of any agreement between Mercosur and 
the European Union.  
On substance, it is difficult to see much difference in Brazil’s ne-
gotiating position between this administration and the previous one. 
All the major challenges at the WTO had been launched under Car-
doso and Brazil’s stand has not changed substantially. The strategy 
adopted, however, particularly at the WTO, has been distinct, involv-
ing the establishment of coalitions meant to transcend the specific 
negotiation sessions. These coalitions, in this case, were distinctly 
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South-South, and they were explicitly given a broader political sig-
nificance, primarily by Brazil, but also by India and South Africa. The 
two main outcomes of this strategy, the G-20 and the India–Brazil–
South Africa (IBSA) initiative, have in fact become somewhat institu-
tionalized, the first through formal meetings, and the second through a 
formal declaration and a program of action.  
In addition, to these broad multilateral initiatives, a number of 
smaller arrangements have been promoted involving Mercosur with 
various countries. None of these agreements involve major economies 
or even major economic partners of Brazil, most have not advanced 
beyond expression of interest and none has yet implied the liberaliza-
tion of significant sectors of the Brazilian economy or access for its 
exporters to significant markets.  
Another issue, very recent, also merits mention. On the occasion 
of the prolonged state visit by China’s President along with a large 
and high-level delegation, the Brazilian government accepted China’s 
request to be formally considered a market economy in the framework 
of the WTO. Given the overwhelming prominence of China as a target 
of dumping accusations by Brazilian companies, this is extremely 
significant: it means that Brazil recognizes that the price of products 
in China is not determined by state intervention, and thus that the 
dumping assessment procedure must involve very complex, time-
consuming and ultimately expensive investigations in China itself. In 
practice, it means that anti-dumping has now become much less effec-
tive as a defensive weapon against China’s cheap exports to Brazil. 
Given the broadly recognized challenges the latter represent for Latin 
American manufacturers as a group (Moreira 2004), it is no wonder 
that private sector organizations have complained bitterly (OESP 
2005a).  
Up to this point, and perhaps surprisingly, little mention has been 
made of Mercosur. Over the last two years and in part because of the 
economic crisis in Argentina, the regional agreement has been going 
through one of its periodic bouts of crisis and mutual criticism. In 
addition to a succession of “wars” between the two countries – from 
fridge and washing machines to shoes and salter flour –Argentina is 
now asking for the formalization of mechanisms meant to balance 
trade between the two countries and to authoritatively allocate FDI 
among Mercosur members. Brazilian business organizations have in 
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turn accused Argentina of impeding progress on a number of trade 
agreements. The problems are not limited to relations with Argentina, 
moreover: Brazil and Uruguay have been fighting bitterly for the posi-
tion of director general of the WTO – which both lost, incidently – 
and even Paraguay has been less than helpful from a Brazilian stand-
point as, for instance, its close relationship with Taiwan is developing 
into a significant stumbling block for any attempts at formalizing a 
trade agreement with Beijing (Ming 2004).  
A formidable amount of writing has been produced to show how 
much trade has grown between the two countries, how much Merco-
sur has become part and parcel of the trade policies of its four mem-
bers, how it is now developing into a major trading block through 
association agreements with basically all of Brazil’s neighbours on the 
continent, how useful it has been as a core negotiation bloc in global 
multilateral fora and how different it is to the other neo-liberal models 
existing or being promoted in the hemisphere (Thorstensen 2002). In 
addition, one could also point to the manifold political ramifications 
of the agreement and to an expanding institutional framework that 
now includes a dispute resolution mechanism to which a “Mercosur 
Parliament” could even be added. Beyond the recent proliferation of 
pitched battles and tensions, however, a growing number of analysts 
point to the challenges confronting the regional regime (Pinheiro 
Guimarães 2003; Souza 2003) and even to its crisis, progressive decay 
and growing dysfunctionalities (Costa Vaz 2004: 248; Lambert 2004). 
From the standpoint of Brazil’s trade policy and especially in broad 
economic terms, moreover, it appears that Mercosur remains utterly 
marginal: in 2003, after more than a decade of integration, total manu-
facturing trade between Brazil and its three partners, at US$ 11.7bn, 
represented less than 2.5% of Brazil’s GDP (WTO 2004: 3, 187, 189). 
Notwithstanding the continuing economic problems of its three junior 
partners and the tensions with Argentina, fast growing trade with 
China is quickly leading to the marginalization of the bloc as a trading 
partner for Brazil. From the standpoint of the current trade negotiation 
processes, finally, the cooperation with South Africa, India and espe-
cially China clearly dwarf the contribution of the Brazil’s Mercosur 
partners. This does not necessarily mean that Mercosur’s survival is at 
stake, but suggest that there is little economic reason for Brazil to 
consider it a priority. 
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3.2 Security: Pragmatic Assertiveness 
Ever since WWII, Brazil has had a very low profile on international 
security issues and in fact, with a few exceptions – its formal leader-
ship of the Inter-American expeditionary force in the Dominican Re-
public in 1965, in particular – it has been essentially absent from the 
global and even from the regional security picture. As a slightly trou-
bled, self-centred and benign non-interventionist giant, and through a 
professional and effective diplomacy, it has certainly contributed to 
the remarkably low conflictivity of international relations in South 
America. There is little open debate in the political establishment 
about the basic tenets of the country’s international security policy: 
pacifism, multilateralism, non-intervention, respect for sovereignty 
and non-proliferation have been little contested since civilian rule was 
re-established in the 1980s. The new government, far from challeng-
ing these principles, has in fact loudly reaffirmed them in the face of 
the US-pushed war on terror, of its challenges to multilateralism, of its 
aggressive interventionism and of its challenges to sovereignty 
(Almeida 2004).  
While the rhetoric has been consistent and even insistent, the new 
government’s commitment to those principles appears to be less solid 
or at least more complex. Brazil’s policy seems in fact to have been 
guided much less by such abstract principles than by a very pragmatic 
attitude structured around, on the one hand, the consolidation of its 
autonomy and influence in the hemisphere and, on the other, by the 
Brazilian government’s quest for a larger and more visible role at the 
global level, in part through its accession to a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council. 
The most visible and perhaps most surprising foreign policy initia-
tive of the new government has been its involvement in Haiti. On the 
face of it, and also in the official story, Brazil is only doing there what 
it has done efficiently and with honour in more than twenty other 
countries over the last thirty years: keeping the peace and helping 
stabilise, following a request by the UN, a country reeling from a re-
cent conflict, or riven by political tensions and threatened by violence 
(Lula da Silva 2004; Amorim 2005). As was clear from the very be-
ginning, however, Haiti is a somewhat peculiar case. Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide, whose regime had admittedly little to recommend it, was 
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nonetheless broadly recognized as the legitimate President of his 
country. The circumstances under which he left his post remain mud-
dled, but it is very clear that America’s and France’s pressure, and 
possibly their soldiers’ presence and attitude, led to his leaving the 
Presidency and the country altogether in the midst of a civil war (ICG 
2004: 11). The formalities were respected, with the Security Council 
adopting the required resolution authorizing the deployment of mostly 
French and American troops (1542), and with most UN State mem-
bers recognizing the new government of Gérard Latortue. This nice 
international consensus, however, was strongly challenged by a num-
ber of states whose democratic credentials are, for the most part, 
pretty sound: CARICOM countries strongly denounced the interven-
tion and even South Africa refrained for quite some time from recog-
nizing the new government. While these governments have by now 
fallen back in the global fold, Venezuela is still holding firm, with 
Chavez vocally denouncing the new regime as illegitimate during the 
October 2004 Rio Group meeting (OESP 2004f). 
The Franco-American intervention risked becoming increasingly 
expensive politically in the face of the forceful mobilization of Aris-
tide’s Lavallas partisans, incensed at his departure, and bolstered by 
the former President’s rabid denunciation of the coup, from his South 
African exile. The search was therefore on for an international force 
that could maintain a degree of stability while giving a more neutral 
face to the foreign presence. Lula’s Brazil volunteered to lead the 
mission and to provide the largest contingent. In a situation eerily 
reminiscent of the 1965 coup in the Dominican Republic, Brazilian 
soldiers under a multilateral flag were giving a political cover to a US 
initiative which even The Economist has called “a coup” (The Econo-
mist 2004). Given that context, the Brazilian mission has received a 
surprisingly warm welcome in the country and, in spite of the lan-
guage barrier, of the delays in other countries’ contribution of soldiers 
and money, and through the most deadly hurricane to hit the island in 
a century, they appear to be doing a reasonable job (ICG 2004; 2005). 
Much noise was admittedly generated by a critical report published by 
students from Harvard Law School and the Centro de Justiça Global 
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(HLSAHR/CJG 2005), but the latter wildly inflated expectations2 
simply cannot be used as a template to assess. Still, the situation re-
mains extremely tense and confused, hundreds of people have been 
assassinated, and a real stabilization of the situation is clearly not in 
sight. For Brazil, moreover, it is somewhat of a stretch to reconcile the 
provision of a cover to such a blunt external intervention with a hard 
commitment to sovereignty and non-intervention. Most analysts have 
not even tried, linking instead Brazil’s involvement with its campaign 
for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Sader 2004; The 
Economist 2004). And indeed, when Colin Powell visited Brazil in 
October 2004, he made a point of emphasizing the country’s contribu-
tion of hemispheric stability, “particularly in Haiti” (OESP 2004d; 
2004e). 
Such a pragmatic attachment to principles also appears to domi-
nate Brazil’s commitment to multilateralism, under this government as 
under its predecessors. Indeed, Brazil appears to be quite selective 
regarding the level at which multilateralism is to be sought. Specifi-
cally, Brazilian diplomacy pursues the consolidation of multilateral 
institutions at the global and sub-hemispheric levels, but emphatically 
not hemispheric ones. The logic of such a preference is quite straight-
forward: for a country that globally ranks only as a middle power, 
global multilateralism offers the promise of great power management 
through balancing coalitions; in a hemisphere shared with the world’s 
largest power, this simply is not an option as no coalition can truly 
hope to balance the hegemony; at the regional level, conversely, the 
crystallization of power relationships in multilateral institutions cre-
ates constraints that are much stronger for the large number of little 
players than for the dominant one. What Brazil seeks at the global 
level – balancing coalitions – is out of question for its competitors in 
South America, and what it denies the US at the hemispheric level  
                                                     
2  One wonders what recent multilateral peace mission, including passed ones in 
Haiti, could satisfy the lofty hopes of those critics: “Armed with a robust man-
date, MINUSTAH has the potential to end Haiti’s cucles of violence, develop fair 
and democratic institutions, and nurture a culture that honors and promotes hu-
man rights” (HLSAHR/CJG 2005: 48). MINUSTAH, in other words, “has the 
potential” to radically change centuries of political decay, authoritarianism and 
corruption in a matter of months... 
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– the institutionalization of regional dominance – it seeks in South 
America.  
While this general “model” of selective – or tactical – multilateral-
ism also appears to be followed in its trade policy, Brazil’s behaviour 
in regional security fora since Lula’s election certainly expresses it 
most vividly. In recent hemispheric summits on security and defence, 
in Mexico (2003) and Quito (2004), the US and its Canadian ally have 
promoted a number of propositions that sought to consolidate hemi-
spheric security institutions (OAS/CHS 2003; 2004). The most ambi-
tious ones regarded the reform of the Inter-American Defence Board, 
the formalization of continental cooperation on terrorism and the in-
volvement of the military in the fight against organized crime. On all 
these counts, Brazil was one of the main voices of opposition and, 
given the general scepticism of most American states in the face of 
arrangements that would simply enshrine the massive military asym-
metry that prevails in the hemisphere, all the relevant proposals were 
defeated. Ironically, given that the Quito meeting took place while 
Brazil was committing to staying one more year in Haiti, the debate 
was won to a large extent in the name of national sovereignty and 
non-intervention (OCSD 2004a; 2004b). Conversely, Brazil has been 
keen, at the annual reunions of the Rio Group and at the founding 
meeting of the South American Community of Nations, on proposals 
for military cooperation at the sub-hemispheric level.  
The third security dimension touches again the issue of multilater-
alism, but it regards something that had become a kind of taboo in 
Brazilian foreign policy circles: non-proliferation. Ever since the Sar-
ney government and its followers launched and then sealed the rap-
prochement with Argentina around the burial of their respective mili-
tary nuclear programs, a turn was taken regarding proliferation that 
appeared to be co-substantive with democratization itself: the social 
consensus that had existed regarding the need for the country not to 
abide by such an asymmetrical regime as the NPR appeared to morph 
in a few years into its opposite, with non-proliferation becoming a 
core principle of the country’s foreign policy. While this appeared to 
gel under Cardoso’s international strategy of “participatory inclusion” 
(Vigevani/Cepaluni 2007), a number of incidents suggest that Lula 
himself and quite a few people around him partake of the older out-
look (Goldemberg 2004).  
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The first incident took place during the electoral campaign, when 
Lula, addressing a military audience, complained that “the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, signed by Brazil, only creates obligations for the 
weaker countries” (OESP 2002). Immediately, the possibility that a 
PT government would denounce the treaty were quickly dismissed as 
misrepresentations and support for the country’s commitment to the 
regime was strongly reaffirmed. Once Lula was elected, however, the 
theme kept popping up in declarations of his Minister of Science and 
Technology. Again, the implications of the latter were minimized and 
the general thrust of the country’s policy reaffirmed. More recently, 
however, a row developed between Brazil and the IAEA regarding 
inspections to the Resende nuclear facilities. That row was resolved to 
the satisfaction of the IAEA authorities, but not before doubts were 
raised, particularly in the US, albeit not mainly from the Bush admini-
stration, about Brazil’s commitment to the NPR (Aronson 2005; 
Deutch/Kanter et al. 2004: 75-78).  
There are no grounds at this point to think that Brazil wants to de-
velop nuclear weapons. This series of events, however, suggest that 
the government wants to assert its ability to decide for itself how it is 
to deal with the issue, without interference from foreign countries, 
intrusions from international organizations, or abstract attachment to 
principles. This attitude, stronger with this government although not 
new, expresses again a degree of pragmatism towards multilateral 
institutions and even a growing scepticism about those regimes that 
are felt to unfairly limit the ability of the country to pursue its own 
objectives and to defend its own interests. Such a stand on nuclear 
energy, along with those that regard intervention and multilateralism, 
must be understood as part of the broader, less abstractly principled 
outlook of this government’s foreign policy. 
 
3.3 Political Diplomacy: Seeking Recognition and Getting it 
Brazil’s foreign policy under this government, or for that matter most 
previous ones, cannot easily be subsumed under the defence and pro-
motion of economic or security interests. Lots of efforts and resources 
have been devoted to endeavours whose concrete material and politi-
cal implications are ambiguous and even sometimes contradictory. 
There is something else at stake that simply cannot be reduced to nar-
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rowly defined interests and one must consider that power and prestige 
as such, independently of their potential “use”, are a central objective 
of that policy. In the case of the current government, the most impor-
tant manifestation of these meta-endeavours is certainly Brazil’s in-
tense and even aggressive quest for a permanent seat on the UN Secu-
rity Council. 
In September 2004, an article in the Estado de São Paulo stated 
bluntly that Foreign Minister Celso Amorim had convinced “Lula to 
make the country’s aspiration to a permanent seat in the Security 
Council the main objective of Brazilian diplomacy” (OESP 2004d). 
While the primacy of the objective might be disputed, it is impossible 
not to see that references to this goal are now standard in foreign pol-
icy statements and in analyses of foreign policy (Guimarães 2001; 
Saraiva 2005). 
Yet, both Brazil’s rhetoric and its international behaviour force 
one to look beyond that objective and focus instead on its meaning. 
For what is sought in fact is a broad and belated – from Brazilian el-
ites’ standpoint – recognition of Brazil’s importance in the world. 
That famous permanent seat should thus be seen essentially as a sym-
bol of that recognition, a symbol that is now being sought with in-
creasing energy. And indeed, Brazil’s claim to that seat has been a 
constant in the country’s diplomacy and a sine qua non in Lula’s nu-
merous meetings with foreign leaders, from Omar Bongo to Vladimir 
Putin. It cannot have escaped Brazilian diplomacy, however, that in 
practice, a permanent seat on the Security Council, especially as part 
of a significantly expanded council, could make the latter even less 
responsive and relevant to the management of global security issues.  
Along with most proponents of an expanded Council, however, 
Brazil and the other contenders – Germany, Japan, South Africa, In-
dia, and perhaps also Egypt or even Indonesia – argue that the height-
ened legitimacy of an expanded structure would ipso facto make it 
more effective, an argument that was also supported by an independ-
ent commission on UN reform, and by Kofi Annan himself (OESP 
2004c). Given the insistence of the seat-seekers on their own individ-
ual candidacy, however, one is left with the strong impression that 
none of them would withdraw its claim, even if it were shown that an 
expanded council would be less effective. For all of them, in sum, the 
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whole issue appears to be primarily symbolic, with UN legitimacy and 
effectiveness a lesser if not a marginal preoccupation.  
In the case of Brazil for instance, the claim is presented above all 
as a matter or realism and justice, not in terms of what Brazil’s pres-
ence would concretely add. “Representation” strictly speaking, i.e. the 
diplomatic construction of a major international power identity ap-
pears to be the core driver of the campaign – something it arguably 
has been since the very beginning of that quest, shortly after WWII.  
The process through which Brazil promotes its candidacy, how-
ever, is possibly as revealing of the logic and ultimate motives as its 
quest for a permanent seat. It shows how much Brazil has now out-
grown the Americas, how effective it is at alliance- and coalition-
building, how pragmatic it is in its choice of partners and institutional 
basis, and finally how ready it is to pay a price for reaching for what 
are not by any means material or security gains.  
Brazil has explicitly and systematically sought support for its 
claim through bilateral contacts and visits, particularly with current 
permanent members. It has in fact received such support, more or less 
explicitly from, among others, Russia, France, the US, and China. It 
has also joined a formal coalition of potential joiners, the G-4, along 
with Germany, Japan, and India (OESP 2004b). In parallel, it has also 
formed, with India and South Africa, a multi-facetted quasi-alliance, 
now dubbed IBSA (Taylor 2004), whose members also present them-
selves as natural candidates to the Council. Brazil, finally, has also 
tried to enlist the support of Latin American state groupings, particu-
larly the Rio Group and now the South American Community of Na-
tions, albeit without convincing them of its exclusive claim to repre-
sent them at the Council (LAWR 2004). 
Aside from diplomatic pressure and work with self-interested 
groupings – the G-4 and IBSA – Brazil’s campaign has also implied 
costs and concrete commitments. Sometimes, as in the case of Gabon, 
it simply involved forgiving a debt of $30 million that would never 
have been paid. With the countries that count, however, i.e. primarily 
the Council’s permanent members (P-5), more apparently needed to 
be offered, and more was. Here, the question of Haiti for the US and 
France has to have played a role, and Colin Powell suggested as much 
when, visiting Brasília, he mentioned together Brazil’s possible mem-
bership in the Council and its significant contribution to the stability 
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of the region, particularly in Haiti. With China and Russia, commer-
cial concessions – China’s “market economy” status – and strategic 
collaboration, for instance around space initiatives, certainly have 
helped generate openness.  
That being said, it would probably be a mistake to make a narrow 
reading of these agreements between Brazil and current permanent 
members of the Council. Clearly, the latter are open to Brazil’s grow-
ing involvement in the world or at least they see it as something nor-
mal. The Club, in other words, appears to be interested and the recent 
intensification of collaboration must probably be seen less as instances 
of short term bargaining than as points in a much broader pattern of 
collaboration.  
Brazil in sum, appears to be increasingly successful in its claim to 
“big powerdom”. In political diplomacy, as in trade and security, Bra-
zil’s commitment to current multilateral arrangements, in this case the 
UN system, goes hand in hand with a challenge to their legitimacy and 
effective diplomacy and coalition-building geared at challenging their 
existing make-up.  
 
4. Success? The Prize and its Price 
In general terms, there is little doubt that Lula’s foreign policy has 
been a success: the visibility, prestige and influence of Brazil in the 
world have never been greater. Not only has Lula’s hyper-active di-
plomacy taken him all over the planet, but conversely, at this point in 
time, Brazil appears to be the most popular partner or the preferred 
guest in the whole world: at the G-3, G-4, G-7, G-8, G-20, G-22 and 
L-20; in New York, Davos, Libreville, Luanda or Delhi; or of Bush, 
Chirac or Putin. Brazil, its President, its foreign minister and its dip-
lomats are becoming “normal” and a sought after presence in fora 
where significant trade, political and even security issues are dis-
cussed. To the extent that such a recognition of Brazil’s influence and 
prestige is a fundamental goal of the country’s diplomacy and a keen 
desire of its elites since at least the beginning of the century, the for-
eign policy of this government is a resounding success.  
Moreover, and although it is much more difficult to assess, the 
progress made looks unlikely to be undone, for two main reasons. The 
first is Brazil’s sheer demographic and economic weight in the world. 
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As much of the Western world – except the US – is shrinking demog-
raphically, as prospects for rapid growth in fast-greying Europe and 
Japan appear to be disappearing for good, as Russia’s institutional 
weaknesses look increasingly intractable, and as Africa looks set for 
many more decades of misery, a stable and liberal Brazil looks con-
vincingly, after China and India, like one of the few significant major 
players in the new century’s global game (NIC 2004; Boyer/Truman 
2005: 147-1483). Brazil’s massive and unchallengeable prominence in 
South America is the second basis of its definitive claim to global 
relevance. The economic and political consolidation that followed 
Lula’s election crystallizes that prominence in a region blighted by 
seemingly intractable problems. While Brazil’s explicit claim to re-
gional prominence remains contentious politically, contenders such as 
Argentina and Venezuela, however noisy, will simply never be able to 
challenge it.  
For both these reasons, what happens at the Security Council is, 
symbolism aside, irrelevant: Brazil has joined the Club and, as Ger-
many, Japan and now India have shown over the years, a permanent 
seat at the Council is not a requisite for membership. The foregoing 
analysis suggests in fact that Brazil’s global gains derive more from 
the changes that took place domestically than from the hectic activism 
that has characterized its foreign policy in recent years.  
Now, if Brazil’s diplomatic activism is not the fount of the coun-
try’s newly minted global prestige, what has it produced exactly? 
Well, the least one can say is that concrete results, while far from neg-
ligible, are not bountiful. 
Some political gains certainly have been made, especially in trade 
fora, as Brazil has established itself as a major power broker, contrib-
uting mightily to a redefinition of the politics of global trade policy, 
notably at the WTO, but also in the FTAA process. The extent to 
which this implies a democratization of the process is less clear. Bra-
zil, like every country involved, seeks less a change of the system than 
a change in the system, whereby its own ability to influence outcomes 
is maximized. The tensions with some African countries around agri-
                                                     
3  This is especially true from the US’ standpoint: in 2002, Brazil, with $91.8bn 
worth of US investment, was second only to Mexico (at $137.3), and signifi-
cantly more important than Korea ($75.4) and China ($28.0). Cf. Boyer/ Truman 
(2005, Table 5.1 and 5.2, respectively p. 148 and 150).  
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cultural subsidies and tariffs, which Brazil seeks, but about which 
former European colonies and net food importers are more ambigu-
ous, is a case in point (Panagariya 2004).4  
This particular problem points to the limits of the South-South 
agenda to which the government has committed itself and devoted so 
much jet fuel and rhetoric: beyond generalities about under-develop-
ment and “periphery”, the “South” simply does not define a general 
community of interest, a shared identity or a common outlook. As 
Brazil finds out on a daily basis, the closer the neighbours, the lesser 
the support for its global endeavours: Leaving aside the bitter fight 
that opposed Brazil and Uruguay about the position of secretary-
general of the WTO – which both countries ended up losing – no sig-
nificant Latin American country supports Brazil’s claim to a perma-
nent seat at the UN security council. Further abroad, one cannot but be 
sceptical of the long-term potential of IBSA, given India’s rigid stance 
on so central an issue as agricultural liberalization. South Africa’s 
very “independent” views on Haiti – whose exiled President has taken 
up residence in Nelson Mandela’s quarters – also promise less than 
automatic blessing for Brazil’s global endeavours. As to China, there 
is no indication that its policy will be any less cold-blooded towards 
Brazil than it is towards everybody else.  
The launch of the South American Community of Nations in 
Cuzco (December 2004) proved to be an anti-climax: only five Presi-
dents showed up, none from Brazil’s Mercosur partner countries; of 
those five, only three signed on a founding Protocol (Brazil, Chile, 
and Peru) that includes no specific target beyond an abstract commit-
ment to total integration in 15 years. The first South American and 
Arab Countries Summit, in Brasília (May 10-11, 2005), proved to be 
similarly disappointing: beyond the announcement of a still-to-be-
signed free-trade framework agreement between the Gulf Cooperation 
                                                     
4  These tensions came to the fore during the campaign for the general secretariat of 
the WTO, in which the candidate from Mauritius was seen as a threat for Brazil: 
“No ponto de vista do governo brasileiro, sob a condução do chanceler das Ilhas 
Maurício [Jaya Krishna Cuttaree], a OMC tenderia a concluir a Rodada Roha 
sem os avanços pretendidos na eliminação de subsídios e outros esquemas tortuo-
sos do comércio agrícola que, supostamente, favorecem os países africanos.” O 
Estado de São Paulo, April 19, 2005, “Brasil pode apoiar Lamy à OMC”. 
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Council and Mercosur – which barely trade at all at this point –5 not 
only were the Presidents of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, among others, 
absent, but the biggest event of the meeting was the very public snub 
of Nestor Kirchner, who left the event after one day, even though Ar-
gentina’s requested statement on the Malvinas had been included in 
the final declaration (OESP 2005b).6  
It appears in fact that relations with the North hold much more 
promise and are likely to be much easier to manage than with a frac-
tured, poor and unstable South. Security Council reform is a case in 
point as support for Brazil is much stronger among Northern powers 
than almost anywhere else in the world. The paradox is momentous 
but inescapable: it is only in the North that Brazil finds support for its 
claim to be a voice of the South... Which says a lot about the “suc-
cess” of the government’s South-South campaign. 
From a narrow economic standpoint the results are also extremely 
thin. At a time where constraining fiscal and monetary policy make its 
economy’s health more dependent than ever on exports, Brazil se-
cured significant market access … nowhere. Its diplomats were able to 
lead, organize or single-handedly man blocking coalitions in all the 
trade fora where concessions were asked, but little was offered: Doha, 
the FTAA, the EU-Mercosur negotiations. They were able to launch a 
plethora of smaller trade initiatives and to sign a variety of agreements 
with a multitude of partners: India and South Africa, the South-
American Community, Bolivia, the Andean Community, the South 
African Community Union (SACU), the Gulf Cooperation Council, 
and so on, but none of those agreements really has sizeable implica-
tions for the tenth biggest economy in the world. Admittedly, not 
much was on offer, but the results remain disappointing.  
On security issues, finally, the continuing inability of the US to 
consolidate a hemispheric regime that would reflect its priorities  
– terrorism and organized crime for now – is consistent with long-held 
and unchanged Brazilian priorities. However, Brazil’s foray in Haiti, 
                                                     
5  According to Brazil’s Minister of Development, Industry and Commerce, Luiz 
Fernando Furlan, South America’s exports represent only 1% of Arab countries’ 
total imports. 
6  See Cervo (2005) for a wildly favourable reading of the Brasília Summit, which 
the author compares, albeit with some reserves, to the Bandung conference in 
1956. 
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which gained its government much credit from Western powers, looks 
increasingly like a political swamp from which the country will soon 
want to extricate itself, leaving not much in its wake except resent-
ment among CARICOM countries and diffidence from every other 
small state in the Americas.  
This experience, however, in all its ambiguities, could well be the 
precursor of many more, especially if Brazil wants to keep its credit 
among big powers, particularly the US: as trouble expands among its 
neighbours, calls from Washington for Brazil to assume “its responsi-
bilities” will no doubt become more strident. Already, Condoleeza 
Rice has pointed to Brazil’s crucial role in containing Venezuela’s 
ambitions. Moreover, as the Andes sink ever deeper into crisis and 
instability, Brazil’s own interests are converging with those of the US: 
can Brasília really afford chaos and failed states in its immediate 
neighbourhood any more than Washington can thousands of kilome-
tres from its Southern border? Regional security is indeed developing 
into the area where Brazil’s claim to a global status will be tested the 
most acutely. It is also an area where the country’s options are quickly 
disappearing: regional “leadership”, however contested, is simply the 
only choice Brazil has, something that Lula, at least, seems ready to 
accept. Such a move has profound implications, in terms of diplomatic 
and military capabilities, but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, in 
symbolic terms. As China and India have discovered, after Russia, 
Japan and especially the US, membership to the Club comes with a 
price: hegemonies, global or regional, are not liked; they are at best 
tolerated, at worse deeply hated. As Brazil consolidates its position in 
South America, it will need to shed its self-image of a benign giant 
and see itself through others’ eyes: a self-interested power seeker, a 
member of the Club, resented and feared by outsiders, accepted and 
relied upon by its members.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Lula’s election, precisely because it led neither to significant policy 
changes nor to political instability, represents a major breakthrough 
for Brazilian foreign policy. It created the conditions for Brazil’s suc-
cessfully claiming of a place, for the first time, among the few domi-
nant global powers.  
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Beyond the specifics of an hyperactive foreign policy, one can de-
tect in Brazilian foreign policy patterns that are consistent with the 
behaviour of such powers. The most striking one is the opportunistic 
resort to international rules and regimes: when existing arrangements 
suit one, they are fully used; when they don’t, their rules and princi-
ples are strongly contested and if necessary, violated. International 
norms and regimes now appear purely as instruments to be used or 
ditched as befit circumstances. Long – apparently? – a principled re-
gionalist, multi-lateralist and non-interventionist, Brazil has now be-
come a tactical one. Mercosur is the right lever in some negotiations, 
the G-20 or IBSA in others, and the G-5 (with other Security Council 
hopefuls) in still others. China is the right ally on some issues, South 
Africa, Venezuela or Chile on others, and the United States, France 
and Russia on still others. Non-intervention is a fundamental principle 
one day at one place, a relative one the week after or somewhere else. 
Such calculating behaviour is not, as such, bad or good. It is the 
mark of those who can adopt it, and get away with it. It is the mark of 
a global power. Brazil’s full membership in the club might not yet be 
perfectly clear, especially to Brazil’s own political and diplomatic 
elites. This is why so much of its foreign policy remains wrapped in a 
South-centred, dependency-laced rhetoric. Soon enough, however, 
prodded in no small measure by denunciations from its closest 
neighbours, Brazil’s foreign policy will discover that its fate lies not in 
“leading” the periphery but, in more than one way, in leaving it.  
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